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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

APPLICATION OF NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS IN SUPPORT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION MITIGATION EFFORTS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The function of this SRP is to support the contention that Civil Support Teams are a valuable resource in the Department of Defense's effort to mitigate the effects of Weapon of Mass Destruction. Research will focus on the cost benefit analysis, legal basis, tactical employment, and technological threat assessment involving these teams. The history of the how CST's were developed and organized will be discussed as well as current operating challenges. Presidential policy directives and Title 10 of the United States Code are referenced as guiding documents for the utilization of CST's. The summary and conclusion positively reflect the position that CST's are an invaluable resource in WMD mitigation efforts. However, the CST program itself would benefit from a reassessment of its organization and staffing.

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PREFACE

I would like to thank all the staff at the Army War College for their assistance and willingness to assist me in the research associated with this SRP. Of special note, I would like to acknowledge the Pennsylvania Army National Guard and the California Army National Guard for access to personnel, material and facilities. This support was a key contribution to my research efforts and the completion of this project.

STRATEGIC ORIGIN OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION POLICY

Throughout the history of the United States the citizens of this great land have felt assured of their safety from foreign invasion or attack from within. The Oklahoma City bombing, World Trade Center bombing, and the USS Cole bombing have disabused us of this illusion. Only during periods of declared war did that sense of security give way to increased security measures, these measures soon dissipated when the conflict abated. In our open society we must balance between managing security concerns and not trampling on the rights of the citizenry.

In response to increased concerns relative to terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the United States government has established a Homeland Security program. A part of this program was the creation, in 1998, of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST's) that would be responsible for responding to a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event. The United States Congress mandated the creation of these teams and tasked the Defense Department to train and equip them.

Initially, 10 civil support teams were created with the specific mission to aid local first responders in dealing with the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Therefore this paper is being written to determine from the strategic position, if these teams are: cost effective, operationally sound and utilized correctly.

Presently, our nation is faced with the consequence of being a strategic leader in a world that often is resentful of our national interests, international policies and national military strategy. As a result we now are faced with what is known as "asymmetric threats" to our security. These threats exist both at home and abroad.

Given the superior military posture the United States enjoys at the moment, and the lack of a peer competitor, almost any antagonist would acknowledge that a direct conventional military assault would end in their destruction. So what options would an antagonist have at their disposal to attack the United States and cause extreme casualties at a minimum risk or cost?

The term that best describes this option is what is known as "asymmetric threats" and includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These weapons may contain chemical, biological and radiological elements that are difficult to produce but, for a price, are relatively easy to obtain. The U.S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that at least 16 countries have active chemical weapons programs.²

Today's world in composed of terrorists, insurgents, counter-insurgents, fundamentalists, extremists as well as anarchists, all with their own agendas and a history of malevolent behavior. Rogue states often have the ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction, train someone on their use and then exploit the use of these weapons. This exploitation can from spraying an anthrax agent into a ventilation shaft of an office building to a suicide bombing of a US naval vessel.

Americans and their facilities are increasingly the focal point of terrorist activities. In 1998 alone U.S. citizens suffered more than 35% of the total number of international terrorist attacks, this is up from 30% in 1997 and 25% in 1996.³ The threat to both Americans abroad and at home is increasing. We can ill afford to ignore the fact that in an open society such as ours we are extremely vulnerable and can easily succumb to the effects of a weapon of mass destruction. Therefore it is incumbent upon this nation to take appropriate and decisive actions to ensure our safety from such weapons and their consequential effects.

In 1998, Public Law 104-201, most commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici act for its authors, provides funding for the US Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command to provide improved capabilities for federal, state and local civilian authorities that respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents.⁴ This law recognized the need for developing a plan to organize, train and fund a comprehensive and strategically oriented program at the national level to mitigate the effects of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat.

To complement this overarching program, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre gave formal approval for the military's reserve components to begin training and equipping to respond in the event of a terrorist incident or accident involving a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) such as a nuclear detonation or the release of a biologic agent such as anthrax or a chemical substance such as sarin gas.⁵

NATIONAL GUARD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITY

The National Guard was subsequently tasked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1998, to begin a study of how it (the National Guard) could best provide assistance to the nation in terms of dealing with the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The essence of this tasking were a series of planning meetings held at the National Guard Bureau in Arlington Virginia wherein a comprehensive study was initiated. ⁶

During the course of this study the participants were able to establish strategic planning and policy concerns. The National Guard Bureau developed a table top exercise in a compact disc format that allowed it to demonstrate and validate the potential roles the National Guard

could contribute in the mitigation efforts associated with a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) event. This mitigation effort was integrated into the federal Integrated Command System (ICS).

No federal program can begin without authorization and funding, the same was true with the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) effort. The Pentagon's FY '99 budget had \$49.2 million specifically identified to begin preparations for:

- Fielding of 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) elements to advise fire, police and other emergency response personnel. Equipping and training of 65 decontamination and 22 reconnaissance elements.
- 2. Training of 100 medical and refining elements.
- 3. Validating the requirements for other response elements.
- 4. Conducting various interagency exercises.

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen quickly determined the need to establish 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams during FY 99. He announced in May of 1998 that the 10 teams would be manned by 22 full-time National Guard personnel and these teams would be positioned in 10 locations. The locations were selected by the Department of Defense and selected based on population density as well as geographical location. These locations include: Los Alamitos, Calif.; Aurora, Colo.; Marietta, Ga.-Dobbins Air Reserve Base; Peoria, Ill.; Natick, Mass.; Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.; Scotia, N.Y—Stratton Air National Guard base; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.; Austin, Texas; and Tacoma, Washington.

The first Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams consisted of 22 team members, these team members were drawn from both Army and Air National Guard organizations. Each team is comprised of the following: Team Commander, Deputy Commander, Operations Team, Administration / Logistics Team, Communications Team, Medical Team and Survey Team. All of these team members are highly trained experts in their fields.

In 1999 the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams (RAID) name was changed to Civil Support Teams (CST). The team's mission remained the same, however; the name change was due in part to the perception that the RAID teams name in of itself had a law enforcement connotation. Civil Support Teams are designed to assist first responders in identifying chemical, biological or radiological contamination, assessing potential impacts of these incidents and lending further technical advice in the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack.⁸

During FY 00 the National Guard prepared to establish an additional 44 traditional National Guard (part-time) Civil Support Teams in states and territories not yet covered by a team. These teams are expected to be operational in FY 02 and will be fully functional at that time. In addition, in FY 00 the National Guard is preparing to establish an additional 17 full-time Civil Support Teams throughout the nation.

It is important to note that the National Guard is not the lead agency in dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction. Civil Support Teams are tasked to be deployable within four hours of being alerted and once on site these teams provide expert assistance to first responders or local authorities involved in consequence management activities. More to the point, the teams provide test equipment and skills that local officials may not possess. In addition, teams have enhanced electronic communication equipment that can be used to contact federal authorities for additional assistance.

LEGAL BASIS FOR FOR USE OF NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

The National Guard is a complex organization that can be difficult to understand in terms of its legal basis and constitutional origin. Title 10 of the United States Code delineates the missions and roles for the active component. Conversely, Title 32 of the United States Code outlines the missions and roles of the Army and Air National Guard.

Simply put, during periods of non-federal service the National Guard is a functional part of the reserve forces of the military residing under the operational control of the governor of the state within in which it is located. This means that during periods of non-federal service the governor can use the National Guard in a wide variety of domestic roles such as military support to civilian authorities and not find himself in violation of Posse Commitatus. Posse Commitatus is the federal law that precludes active duty military forces from being used in domestic or state duties such as local civil disturbances.

In addition, the National Guard is subject to various Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) and numerous other federal and state laws. Establishment of Civil Support Teams is based primarily on Public Law 104-201 (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act). The rules governing the employment of these teams are predicated upon Presidential Decision Directives specifically PDD 39, PDD 62 and PDD 63, as well as the United States Policy on Counterterrorism, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland, and the Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure.

Presidential Policy Directives 39, 62 and 63, provide a codified role for the Army in preparing and managing Homeland Security. During periods of federalization (Title 10) more

commonly referred to as federal active duty, Civil Support Teams will conduct and execute the same skills as during non-federalized periods (Title 32) and will report to a specified active duty commander. During periods of federalization there will be specific missions and tasks that Civil Support Teams may not engage in without approval of their active component commander. This is not an unusual condition and one that occurs on a routine basis when any National Guard organization is federalized.

Presently there is no current doctrine available that specifically addressed Homeland Security and the role of National Guard Civil Support Teams. However, Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993 does address operations other than war and does provide a basis for the general use of teams involved in operations other than war. This obvious shortfall has been noted and is being addressed by the Army. Doctrine is being reviewed and is expected to be fielded in the near future.

RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND FUNDING ALLOCATION

When the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici act was initiated it outlined a five year, potential \$250 million interagency program. The initial plan for the National Guard was to organize 10 Civil Support Teams and position them in specifically identified states for the purpose of consequence management in the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. Follow on teams would be selected and positioned over the next several years. These follow on teams would be positioned based upon population densities, critical infrastructure settings and available funding / resourcing.

During the first year of the program the cost of the initial 10 National Guard Civil Support Teams was \$20 million. Based on the success of the teams, Congress expanded the program and added an additional \$19 million for more equipment, plus \$13 million to establish "light" teams. These "light" teams are staffed by part-time National Guard personnel and a few full-time personnel, providing the team a good mix of staff as well as flexibility. The FY 00 defense bill included another \$64 for support of these teams. ¹⁰

It is also important to note that the cost estimate for the Civil Support Teams was not arrived at arbitrarily. In February 1999, the National Guard awarded a \$7.5 million contract to the Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) to conduct a study to determine any shortfalls in emergency preparations for chemical or biological terrorism in the United States.¹¹

This study identified 11 critical WMD shortfalls, these shortfalls include inconsistent training, logistical planning and inadequate threat analysis. Not an unusual determination given that the National Guard WMD program was less than 2 years old. It is noteworthy to mention

that the National Guard is compiling invaluable cost analysis data and is working toward a standardized training and equipping program. This provides the congress and the National Guard with the information needed to adequately finance and resource the WMD program.

STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES FOR THE USE OF CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT – LIMITATIONS OF CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS:

Civil Support Teams (CST's) are designed to conduct the following:

- Assess Situations: This includes but is not limited to reconnaissance of a possible WMD situation. The collection of air and other physical samples for the purpose of identification.
- 2. Advise Civilian Responders: This includes mitigation recommendations and efforts, medical response and hazard identification.
- Facilitate: Assist in expediting the request and arrival of additional state and federal resources to help save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage.¹²

Under the current organization and structure there are several limitations that most Civil Support Teams face. These limitations include lack of personnel sustainability, for example, each team is staffed with 22 personnel. However, one must take into account that on any given day there may be several team members unavailable for missions because of: military schools, civilian school, leave, sick / injury, and temporary duty (TDY) in another area. ¹³

Additionally, the very structure of the Civil Support Teams limits their sustainability. All the personnel on the team are needed to accomplish a specified mission. If a mission were to exceed 24 hours in duration, the sustainability of the team becomes subject to team member's own physical stamina. Said another way, there are not enough team members to operate a team for more than 24 hours, seven days a week.

Another limitation of the Civil Support Teams is the ability to respond to an incident within 4 hours of notification. Several factors impact this response time. The most significant of which I have already identified and that is staffing, not enough full-time team members. That issue not withstanding, one must consider the matter of transportability of CST equipment by air. The Ford Vans and other wheeled vehicles that are used by the CST's can be air transported by C130, C141, C5 and C17 military cargo aircraft.

However, these aircraft are almost always in short supply and are not on standby to transport a CST to a potential WMD event, this includes Guard and Reserve aircraft. The

commercial vehicles used by the CSTs are not transportable by helicopter, although some of the team's equipment is loadable on a 463L-cargo pallet that is air transportable by helicopter.

Again, the issue of equipment prepositioning and aircraft / aircrew availability calls into question the 4 hour response time that is expected of the CST. Lastly, CST's have far more equipment than can be fitted into the Mobile Analytical Lab (MALs). This means additional vehicles must be obtained and used when a more efficient vehicle should be considered.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

CST's cannot collect information on United States citizens per Executive Order 12333, and as governed by Intelligence Oversight. This means that the teams may collect and analyze data relevant to their duties in the WMD arena but cannot engage in information collection in areas other than those approved by the Department of Defense. The reason this is even a concern is the close interaction that CST's can have with law enforcement agencies and the potential for one agency to develop false expectations of the CST or to be fully cognizant of the CST's data collection limitations.

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Significant recruitment and retention issues confront CST commanders at all levels. At the moment all CST members are Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel and are recruited and hired based on their military and civilian skills as well as their overall military performance. The organizational structure or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) for a CST ranges the spectrum from sergeant (E5) to lieutenant colonel (05). What is most challenging about the organizational structure is that each team member must attend about 1800-1900 hours of advanced training in a wide variety of nuclear, biological, chemical and medical skills.¹⁴

It is relatively easy to recruit the enlisted force, what is more difficult to recruit is the officer force for a CST. Particularly the physicians assistant, medical operations officer, and nuclear medical science officer. This is due in large measure to two mitigating factors. First, is the current tight labor pool in that individuals with these specialized skills are most often not interested in becoming AGRs due to the demands of the position. Second, is the corresponding salary differential. Officers with the necessary skills needed by the CST are usually already employed and are earning far more than what they would earn on active duty.

Attrition for CST's is approaching, in excess of 30% for the original 10 teams.¹⁵ Enlisted team personnel are highly compartmentalized in the team and upward mobility for them is governed by Select Train Assign and Promote (STPA); this is the enlisted promotion program

for the Army National Guard. This means a fully qualified enlisted team member who is fully trained after approximately 18 months of being on a team will most often rise to the top percentile of their respective promotion list. In order to be promoted, a position must be available for them to promote into. If there is not a position for them on the team in the next higher grade, the team member may elect to transfer to a position outside the team. Once promoted out of the team, that person must be replaced and they take with them hundreds of hours of highly specialized and expensive training.

Equally as distressing is the fact that team members do not receive any form of additional pay or allowances for their tour of duty on a CST. Military recruiters for example receive in the area of \$300 per month incentive pay to compensate them for irregular hours and the responsibilities they incur as recruiters. CST team members who are on call 24 hours per day, seven days per week and who stand the potential for exposure to toxic and dangerous elements receive no additional compensation.

In addition, once CST members are fully trained they are both marketable and highly employable in the private sector. What is now beginning to emerge is a migration of qualified CST member's out of the CST or back to part-time status and their subsequent employment with civilian employers who are willing to compensate them for their skills in the marketplace.

ANALYSIS / RECOMMENDATIONS

The utility of the Civil Support Teams within the National Guard is without question a value-added protection for the nation. These teams provide local first responder's additional resources that can help save lives, minimize human suffering and mitigate property damage. Having said that, there is much room for improvement within the CST program. Each CST is a state asset (Title 32) when not in a federal status and therefore is subject to the nuances of the Adjutant General (TAG) of that state. This gives each TAG a great deal of latitude in team development.

For example, in some states the CST's are issued specific identification that appears similar to law enforcement credentials. In other states, CST members rely strictly on a DD Form 2 (Military Identification Card) for identification. In addition, each state has a slightly differing training program used to certify CST members. The federal government, collectively, offers specific and standardized training programs for first responders. The problem is that there does not appear to be a central database or clearing house of training programs available for these team members to avail themselves of.

To more fully analyze this situation, I have outlined several key problems and developed recommendations that merit consideration. These problems are delineated in a three subparagraph format as shown below:

Problem: Tactical Employment – Limitations of Civil Support Teams. CST's are designed to assess situations, advise civilian responders and facilitate. These teams cannot maintain 24 hour a day operations and they cannot deploy to all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) events within the 4-hour response time with all twenty-two assigned personnel.

Discussion: Simple mathematics identifies the issue at hand. To be able to respond to any event within a 4-hour period of time it is imperative to have an aircraft available to move a CST (with all of its associated equipment) as required by policy. It is also essential to have enough trained personnel on hand to provide sustained operations and personnel redundancy. Presently, the CST's are only manned to bare minimum standards that provides no room for any personnel turbulence such as absences for school, leave, TDY or illness. This in turn places all the other team members at risk in terms of fatigue, exposure and skill mismatch.

Recommendation: It is recommended that consideration be given to doubling the personnel size of the CST's from 22 to 44. This then would truly provide personnel redundancy in the program and provide a higher degree of flexibility for the CST itself. Additionally, having aircraft and aircrews available on 4 hours notice is highly problematic. An option to consider would be to increase the response time for a CST to a WMD from 4 hours to 10 hours. This at least provides the team enough time to adequately and realistically arrange for transportation and they can conduct more incident assessments prior to their arrival. Most certainly the teams could respond within 10 hours, but maintaining a 4-hour response is a challenge that usually cannot be met and can only serve to detract from the overall credibility of the CST program.

Problem: Recruitment and Retention. CST staffing is an ongoing issue. The positions are academically demanding and the soldiers who will fill those positions must display mature decision making in an asymmetrical environment. Given the approximately 1900 hours spent on their training, multiple TDY assignments, on call status and lack of articulated career progression, many of these soldiers depart after their first assignment. This is a huge retention issue involving highly skilled personnel. Another consideration is that the demands and constraints of the assignment put off potential applicants for these positions.

Discussion: As the novelty of the CST wears off and certification of these teams becomes a reality, the challenges of recruiting and retention may become more problematic

than ever. When the Department of Defense originally created the CST's, it appears little thought was put into what would happen to these highly skilled and compartmentalized individuals after a few years. Each CST member is so highly trained that their very training makes them a sought after employee in the private sector. Taking into consideration that career progression within the CST was not accounted for or projected, it is small wonder that CST personnel find themselves facing a glass ceiling. They must progress for their own career development and retention within the AGR program.

This issue is particularly true for officers assigned to the CST. For example, is the team commander, typically a lieutenant colonel, given battalion command credit for his or her tour of duty as the CST commander? Under the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) a lieutenant colonel is mandatorily boarded for consideration to colonel with approximately 4 years time in grade.

One of the key discriminators in selection for promotion to colonel is having successfully completed two years of command at the battalion or squadron level. This is an issue that has yet to be explored. Further, the CST science officer and physicians assistant officer positions are almost impossible to fill. One reason is the tight labor market, most of these professionals are already working and receiving compensation greater than their comparative active duty salary. Couple this with limited upward mobility and one can see the manpower challenges the CST's face in the officer recruitment area.

Recommendation: The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) is too narrow in regard to the CST's. It is recommend that all positions for enlisted personnel are upgraded to SFC / E7 with upward mobility to MSG / E8, this provides each soldier a minimum acceptable grade level and corresponding salary growth potential. One way to do this is to modify the TDA to allow for overgrade situations for qualified personnel. Regarding officers, It is further recommend the CST commander and his deputy commander respectively receive command and executive officer credit. Further, it is suggested that all CST members receive hazardous duty pay.

The physician's assistant will always be a difficult position to fill. One option would be to offer financial incentives commensurate with the private sector. The same is recommendation is made for the nuclear science officer position. It is recommended that these hard to fill positions be reevaluated and thought is given to changing the job descriptions to be more in line with what the CST's realistically can support. This would open the potential applicant pool to more qualified officer personnel. It is also recommended that consideration be given to allowing basic branch Medical Service Corps officers and Chemical officers to serve in the positions

presently filled by the PA and nuclear science officer if those positions underwent a reclassification.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To do nothing to protect our country from the dangers of the effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is unacceptable. Walter Laquer wrote:

"The ready availability of weapons of mass destruction has now come to pass, and much of what has been thought about terrorism, including some of our most basic assumptions, must be reconsidered. The character of terrorism is changing, any restraints that existed are disappearing, and above all the threat to human life has become infinitely greater than it was in the past." ¹⁶

Our government has authorized and funded development of the CST teams. These teams are still in their infancy, but offer our country the ability to mitigate the effects of terrorism such as human suffering and great property damage. If used to their fullest, these teams can and will save lives, a fundamental mission of our Army.

However, the time has come to consider if the initial organization of these teams needs to be reassessed. One of the best ways to do so it to solicit input from the commanders of the first 10 CST teams and build upon their ideas and experiences. There is nothing wrong with conducting a systemic review of the CST process particularly given the seriousness of this program.

During this paper I have highlighted the history and origin of the Civil Support Teams, I have discussed current issues facing these teams and provided some ideas for remedying the issues at hand. I conclude by reiterating my assertion that the teams are of great value to our country but could benefit from further refinement and tailoring of resources to continue mission accomplishment.

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